UK aid budgets are increasing. At 0.56% of the UK’s Gross National Income (GNI), the UK spent around GBP 8.5bn last year. This year, and beyond, the government will meet its target of 0.70% GNI, driving spend up to around GBP 11.5bn this year, and GBP 12bn next year (subject of course to how the UK economy actually performs).

This increase in aid budget is happening in the much-publicised context of sweeping budget cuts being enforced on almost all other national and local government departments. Defending this decision is requiring increased levels of political capital to be invested in responding to different stakeholder group interests. The UK public is one significant group where recent research shows:

  1. The majority (62%) of respondents believe it is morally right for the UK to help developing countries.
  2. The majority (64%) of respondents think that tackling poverty at home takes priority over tackling poverty in other parts of the world.
  3. A small majority of respondents (52%) are of the view that most of the aid given by the UK to developing countries is wasted.

As the cuts bite increasingly into the economic and social fabric of the UK, defending this decision and demonstrating the need for and efficacy of aid becomes an increasingly debated domestic political issue. In response, the government is taking increasing executive control of the programming and spending of UK aid. Justine Greening, the UK Secretary of State for International Development, now makes funding decisions directly for all supplier contracts above GBP 1mn, and for all business cases above GBP 5mn (down from the previous GBP 40mn level).

Why is this? Is it because her civil servants in DFID lack the technical ability to make and take programming decisions? Surely not. By its peers, DFID is “recognised as one of the leading development agencies in the world” and was ahead of all other donors in a ranking by aid practitioners from 27 recipient countries, scoring well in terms of efficiency, flexibility, speed of disbursement and alignment with recipient country priorities.

No, DFID is quite capable of making technical decisions on aid programming. The reason Ms Greening is making decisions is entirely political. It’s about political oversight, control and communication, all driven by the increasing politicisation of aid in line with increasing aid budgets.

In short, the framework for taking decisions on all UK aid programming is no longer a technical one; it’s a political one. This assertion is strongly echoed by David Booth in his excellent paper entitled ‘Aid Effectiveness: bringing country ownership (and politics) back in’ who concludes: “Unfortunately, however, the development business is not [now] led by mid-range technical specialists. It is politically led, directly (bilateral) or indirectly (multilaterals), resulting in systemic incentives which override attitudes, and the acquisition of skills.”

As an organisation, we here at the Springfield Centre have considerable experience and expertise in designing development programmes. We continue to do so. However, this new political framework is pressing ever more tightly on all that we do in practice. Whilst perhaps inevitable for the reasons outlined above, it’s also very concerning, as I explain below.

In our experience, this political decision-making framework amplifies a number of key factors:

  • Timing: this is skewed to the short term. Defending aid budgets in an increasingly brighter media spotlight means more visible results, more quickly and more frequently, given the perishable nature of newsworthy media.
  • Risk: there is an assumed linear input-output relationship (i.e. more funding in = more directly proportionate results out). This is not credible. If development means investing in strengthening ‘national systems’ (such systems comprising national government, private sector, civil society stakeholders), then we must accept that the investment starting point is weak and risky, and absorptive capacity low.
  • Ends: we should be more concerned with ensuring investments yield real returns in terms of improved human outcomes, but not at the cost of a complete marginalising of the importance of the means through which these outcomes are realised. The current framework centres almost exclusively on the “what” (do people need to improve) and ignores the “how” (do people get what they need, now and in the future, sustainably and at scale).
  • Visibility: there is an increasing need for direct validation and recognition by those we’re working to support in developing countries. “UK aid from the British People” if you please.

All of these factors are influencing and defining how development is done in practice. If development is a process through which improved human outcomes should result, then surely we must be as concerned with the process as we are with the final outcomes?

In my opinion the current political framework is in danger of seriously compromising the quality of the development process. Rather than encouraging approaches to work with and facilitate national systems to evolve and improve, it is promoting a focus on delivering directly, bypassing national systems. Working with national systems takes longer, so why bother? Institutional quality improvements are not classed as “impacts” and are not as highly valued, so why bother? If contractor payments are now at risk, why should contractors take any risk beyond that which they can control fully and directly?

The approach being promoted, by decision if not by design, is one which is displacing and distorting and undermining the very essence of development. It’s taking us away from facilitation and empowerment, and back to direct delivery and dependency of national stakeholders; a place where development has been before, and where it has worked hard to move from for good reasons.

I am not alone in my concern. The Director of the Development and Cooperation Directorate of the OECD in his 2012 UK mid-term review highlighted similar concerns:

  • Timing: “…risk that DFID’s strong focus on results and value for money distorts the way it wants to work, as it may lead to favour numbered outputs and short term achievements, to the detriment of qualitative results and longer term, sustainable impact.”
  • Ends: “The results framework also needs to retain enough flexibility to avoid undermining DFID’s key objectives and assets (increased focus on fragile states; flexible, context-based approach to aid programming).”
  • Risk / Visibility: “While promoting accountability to the UK taxpayers, DFID does not want to bypass national systems.”

In summary, decisions on UK aid programming need to revert to controlled technical from the increasingly controlling political. DFID has a global reputation for the quality of its technical staff. A failure to use them will see DFID losing them (and it is). This would undermine the future effectiveness of UK aid, and development efforts more globally, given the lead technical role that DFID advisers play in coordinating others.

What then is to be done to achieve this shift? I’d concur with David Booth who says “I fear there is no real alternative to a long-term effort to re-educate politicians and publics in the North about how development happens and about how aid works when it does work”. If I’m clear that this needs to be done, I’m much less clear who will actually stand up and lead on this re-education challenge…!

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